Canadian Government Executive - Volume 24 - Issue 03

46 / Canadian Government Executive // May/June 2018 A common essay question on undergraduate political sci- ence exams is: Could we have parliamentary democ- racy without political parties? Though our constitution makes no explicit mention of political parties (or of the Prime Minister, for that matter), they tend to be treated as indis- pensable to political mobilization and engagement, elections, and responsible government. As we are seeing now in Ontario with the provincial election in full swing, political parties are, first and foremost, electoral ma- chines. They choose and support candidates, rally around their leaders, frame the messages that define political debate, and are primarily responsible for getting the vote out on election day. Es- sentially, they give voters choices. Once the votes are counted, political parties populate the legislature with their elected mem- bers and determine its composition. Each voter casts a single bal- lot in favour of one candidate in the riding and, once every riding determines a winner, the question of who forms the government is resolved largely by the parties’ standings. The role of the Lieutenant Governor is to ensure that there is always a Premier; by both logic and convention, the LG normally asks the leader of the party with the most seats to form a gov- ernment because this person has the best chance of holding the confidence of the legislature. Party discipline is a fact of life in Ca- nadian politics that has the effect of restricting the autonomy of individual members and, in so doing, provides stability to govern- ments. In fact, party discipline might make governments a little too comfortable by virtually inoculating them from vulnerability in the House. If the governing caucus takes more than half of the seats in an election, a loss of confidence is pretty close to impos- sible. Even minority governments are not, by definition, unstable, nor have they been prone to quick defeat in Canada. Holding a plurality of seats rather than a majority makes it necessary to do business with another party in order to get things done; a minor- ity government can take an ad hoc approach to this or, as we have seen in British Columbia, strike a more formal governance ar- rangement with a partner. We’ve become used to thinking of party-style governance as synonymous with Westminster, but there is another way – one that is perhaps even more true to the principles that define West- minster, including executive accountability. The legislative assemblies in Nunavut and the Northwest Ter- ritories both use consensus government as opposed to political parties to organize legislatures and governments. All members are elected as independents in their ridings and, following the election, MLAs get together to choose the Speaker, the Premier, and members of the cabinet via secret ballot. The Premier assigns cabinet responsibilities and portfolios and can shuffle these uni- laterally, but a minister can be removed from cabinet only by a motion of the legislature. Responsible government requires that the Premier and cabinet hold the confidence of the legislature to govern. Clearly, this is a very different way of practicing Westminster than the party politics that define provincial and federal legisla- tures. As a counter-factual, imagine that the House of Commons adopted consensus government: candidates would have to cam- paign for themselves and in ways that are more responsive to lo- cal concerns rather than by waving the party flag; election night suspense would be transformed, as we would have to wait until the legislature meets to find out who the Prime Minister and cabi- net are; those wishing to become members of the executive would have to appeal to their peers in the legislature, likely with prom- ises to pursue particular policy outcomes and to not let power cor- rupt them; the results of votes in the House would no longer be foregone conclusions; the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister would be diluted in the absence of the power to appoint and remove ministers; and, ultimately the executive would be directly and meaningfully accountable to the legisla- ture, as the doctrine of responsible government requires. Through this lens, consensus government seems capable of resolving the most troublesome aspects of party-style politics and government: concentrated power and complicit MPs. By shaking up the power dynamic, consensus government could even boost public engage- ment in politics. It could wake us all up. Party politics reverses the logic of responsible government by fortifying power in the executive branch. Consensus government is an alternative to this and a more authentic realization of the principles of Westminster in that the balance of power lies with the legislature. A switch to consensus government is not likely on the horizon for our federal politicians; concentrated power and disciplined parties are deeply entrenched in the parliamentary precinct. Also, every institutional configuration has its own basket of im- plications, both positive and negative, and consensus government is no different. But, when party politics is presented as inevitable and democratic reform platforms offer little more than tinkering at the edges, let’s remember that consensus government is a con- crete example of how to do things differently in a Westminster context. L ori T urnbull is the interim director of the School of Public Administration at Dalhousie University and a fellow at the Public Policy Forum. THE LAST WORD Consensus Government By Lori Turnbull