Canadian Government Executive - Volume 25 - Issue 03

28 / Canadian Government Executive // August/September 2019 technology W ith defence budgets becoming increasingly scrutinized and private sector technology tra- jectories soaring, Cana- da’s defence procurement is sure to attract significant public attention with calls for reform continuing into the new fiscal year. Whether it’s the Tactical Integrated Command, Control and Communications (TIC3) Air Project (which was the result of bringing three separate projects under one banner), the Enhanced Satellite Com- munication (ESCP) Project (struggles to fund the initial project), or any of the key Canadian Army modernization projects (entering definition in 2021/2022), we’re seeing the symptoms of Canada’s multi- departmental approach to defence pro- curement, which is unique to the country. The current approach According to a Library of Parliament Background Paper (Auger, 2016), Canada’s multi-departmental defence procurement system was introduced during a time of great organizational changes within the federal government. Originally set up with the intent of maximizing the use of resources, increasing administrative pro- ductivity, and achieving significant cost savings, the system has since expanded to more government departments and agen- cies becoming involved in the process. This has resulted in a multi-departmental defence procurement system that is in- creasingly complex and unnecessarily bureaucratic. Such bureaucracy tends to divide opera- tional capabilities into programmatic and technology silos that deliver the interde- pendent components of operational ca- pabilities in an unsynchronized manner, resulting in lengthy delays from a warf- ighter perspective. The frequent outcome is that it takes too many years to deliver a much-needed operational capability — eventually solving yesterday’s problem instead of today’s, and creating critical capability gaps that put our warfighters at an unfortunate disadvantage. Evidence of this is the fact that the typical defence procurement takes many years to reach final delivery – even if ev- erything is done right. These long time- lines and the lack of synchronization among mutually dependent capabilities are genuinely alarming. Meanwhile, pri- vate sector technology trajectories are ad- vancing at unprecedented rates. The stark contrast between defence development timelines and private sector development timelines means the warfighter is left at a technology disadvantage. The defence acquisition process is simply not keeping up, and, as a result, the warfighter suffers. As the multi-departmental defence procurement system makes clear, lack of accountability, slow decision making, ever-changing requirements, and a mas- sive, complex regulatory burden means wasted time and wasted money for the Canadian Government and the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND). Such an outcome is unacceptable for lead- ers of commercial projects—and should be for the military as well. However, even with several initiatives to keep pace with technology A better way By Viasat