Canadian Government Executive - Volume 26 - Issue 01

TECHNOLOGY coordination of the Y2K fix. This role was later extended to serving as the province’s public spokesperson on Y2K in a some- times wild, verging on apocalyptic, atmo- sphere. Cabinet ministers, normally very protective of their public communications role, suddenly seemed allergic to the mi- crophone. They were content to leave this one to me, backed by a full appreciation of the consequences of any failure. I was clearly placed out on a limb where I often heard the dull throb of sawing behind me. Deputy ministers were made account- able for Y2K solutions in their ministries – mandates later extended to the areas of the broader public sector that their ministers presided over, such as health authorities or universities. In addition to my coordinating role, my department was also responsible for government’s core IT infrastructure, so I had to preside over a massive Y2K effort at home. To manage the Y2K coordination exer- cise, we established a team of two dozen government program, technology and communications professionals, which we called Action 2000. Working with technology managers across government, the Action 2000 team established the Y2K remediation stan- dards for deployment across government. As systems were assessed, Y2K fixes devel- oped and were then applied, tested and verified. In a parallel effort, government’s established but oft-ignored business conti- nuity planning process was revved up, and each ministry was required to develop and test an “all-hazard” business continu- ity plan that would enable it to continue to deliver mission-critical services in the event that Y2K brought down its systems. For example, how would government’s central Corporate Accounting System manage billions of dollars in government’s payments and receivables with manual cheque cutting, cashing and accounting processes? The process was considered complete when deputy ministers signed off on both the Y2K remediation and busi- ness continuity plans for their ministries. Deputy ministers were asked by the deputy to the Premier to identify pro- grams and applications in their ministries that were mission-critical to government: where failure could threaten lives, cause economic hardship for British Columbi- ans, cause serious damage to the environ- ment or expose the province to significant loss or liability. Perhaps smelling addi- tional funding that could be used to buy new IT gear, deputy ministers brought forward a large number of programs all of- fered with great bravado to underline the importance of their ministries in govern- ment. These programs were then ranked through the mission-critical criteria. Dep- uty ministers were then informed that the top-ranked programs would be used not to dole out new funding but, rather, as the focus of real-time progress reports on the state of Y2K readiness of key systems on the government’s public Y2K website. In the interest of transparency to sup- port public confidence, deputy minister accountability would be in full exposure. Suddenly, the tide of bravado receded and there ensued a small scramble to pull sys- tems off the mission-critical list. In retrospect, the biggest accountability gap in Y2K related to the computer sys- tems companies that brought us Y2K in the first place! As governments now prosecute drug and tobacco companies for not com- ing clean on known health impacts of their products, IT companies should have seen the flaw in their systems and been held ac- countable for their fixes. Instead, Y2K was an extraordinary “buyer beware” moment for us all – one that foreshadowed the elu- sive sense of responsibility that social me- dia technology companies will accept for their products and services. While some new processes were es- tablished to manage this extraordinary project, important decisions were made to deploy existing processes and test- drive them against a time-set emergency. The central communications machinery of government was used to develop and distribute public and business communi- cations materials, such as the catchy but acronymically laden RU Y2K OK, BC? Y2K readiness checklist and workbook series. Most importantly, however, was the de- cision to deploy the full scope of the Pro- vincial Emergency Preparedness program to manage the province-wide response in the event of a disaster. Y2K test-drove the province’s emergency planning processes like never before and resulted in impor- tant learnings and process changes that made BC better prepared to manage a ma- jor natural disaster like an earthquake. Other processes – new and old – present- ed challenges. The Office of the Auditor General, operating under its established mandate, conducted its own priority sur- vey of the province’s Y2K readiness across core government, key crown corporations (such as BC Hydro), health authorities (of which there were then 52), municipali- ties, and the K-to-12 and post-secondary education systems. The close professional cooperation of the Action 2000 staff with “Our most important Y2K success factor was the clear setting of managerial accountabilities across the government. As CIO, I was responsible for establishing Y2K compliant remediation processes and standards as well as cross-government coordination of the Y2K fix. ” 10 / Canadian Government Executive // January/February 2020