October/November 2022 // Canadian Government Executive / 9 CANADIAN POLITICS 7) FAILURE TO LAUNCH The Conservatives come out with the most votes and seats and do start to form a government because the Opposition feels it has no choice but to concede. The Conservatives may name a Cabinet, fire some people, appoint others and take actions within the powers of the executive. The new PM may even get to represent Canada at an international summit or two. However, by the time they are able to convene Parliament the “progressive” Opposition parties have sorted out their leadership, agreed on a common agenda and mustered the courage to immediately defeat the new government. This was the fate of Ontario Premier Eves in 1985, BC Premier Christy Clark in 2017 and New Brunswick Premier Brian Gallant in 2018. One variant of this collision leads to a second election in 2026 , but with the zombie Conservative government holding the executive levers. We will be discussing the “convention of restraint”. A second variant is that after defeating the Conservatives the Opposition parties form a viable government that is able to start up Parliament, table a budget and a few key bills and then calls an early election to secure a full mandate. Either way the winter and spring of 2026 are turbulent. 8) CONTESTED VICTORY The first past the post system could generate an outcome where the Conservatives win the largest share of votes and the largest number of seats but do not get to form a government. If the Liberals and NDP together have a majority of MPs and can agree that the incumbent Liberal PM should carry on, they can convene the House and present a Speech From the Thone to it, asserting the Westminster principle that what counts is securing confidence of the House. The PM going into the election would still be the PM while this unfolds. This scenario would have already been discussed, heatedly, during the election campaign and party leaders could have already pronounced on it, reducing their flexibility. It raises some unpleasant scenarios where the Conservatives do not accept the outcome gracefully. They may challenge the count in certain constituencies, demand the right to form the government and assert that any other Parliamentary configuration would be a “stolen election” or “undemocratic”. We would talk a lot about “convention” and “legitimacy”. The ugliness we saw in Ottawa in February 2022 may return on a bigger scale. GOVERNING Each of these eight scenarios has implications for policy directions. The election campaign in 2025 will have a lot of influence on the post election agenda but it won’t be binding. Once in power governments may choose to drop commitments or to do things they didn’t talk about during the campaign. Check against delivery. Stuff happens and a lot of governing is responding to shocks and surprises: Stephen Harper encountered a global financial crisis after his win in 2008 and Justin Trudeau faced a sudden global pandemic after his win in 2019. Some of these scenarios are more interesting for those of us who are interested in governance and institutions. They may revive pressure for electoral reform, or Senate reform or abolition. Who knows, the role of the monarchy may suddenly come into focus with the death of the Queen. Some scenarios may lead to redrawing the shape of our federation, again. For everyone who works for or around the federal government there is a good chance that rapids lie ahead. Look ahead and hang on tight. Michael Wernick, Jarislowsky Chair in Public Sector Management, University of Ottawa The least likely scenarios are a four-year window of stability and there is a good chance of a period of considerable turbulence. Canada may be running the rapids from 2024 to 2026 with lurches in policy and priorities and political leaders who focus on week-to-week survival.
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