FEATURE Spring 2025 // Canadian Government Executive / 27 Canada has shown a distinctive enthusiasm for the creation of independent watchdogs over the last fifty years. The proliferation of rules and watchdogs has had a significant effect on political debate and may have reinforced a fixation with problems of control. Watchdogs provide opposition politicians and journalists with a steady flow of reports that seem to substantiate the idea that federal bureaucracy is plagued by rulebreaking. Political as well as administrative controls have expanded since the 1980s. The number of political staff working for ministers has increased substantially, so that the total size of the political cohort now rivals the staffing for the Department of Finance. Political staff frequently intervene directly in the work of the public service, often for good reasons, but sometimes pushing bureaucratic culture of short-termism and risk aversion. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the federal government periodically established independent inquiries to review the condition of the federal public service and consider whether the right balance had been struck between control and performance. The most prominent example is the Glassco Royal Commission, which reported in the 1960s. However, the practice of convening independent reviews was abandoned after the 1970s. The result is that there no adequate check against the continued accretion of administrative and political controls, and entrenchment of a culture of risk-aversion. Conclusion: Restoring Adaptability The adaptability of the Canadian system has declined over the forty years. It does not perform as well as it should in anticipating and managing long-run dangers. In calmer times, a decline of adaptability might not be troubling. But conditions of governance in the coming decades are likely to be turbulent and dangerous. Under such conditions, a decline of adaptability is worrisome. It puts the survival and health of the system at risk. Canadian governments can take steps to improve adaptability. One step is to invest more heavily in the capacity for forward thinking. The federal government might explore the idea of an inquiry like the Macdonald Commission of the 1980s, but redesigned for the digital age. Or it might improve the policy capacity of political parties by creating European-style party think tanks, as the Lortie Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing recommended in 1991. Or it might restore independent advisory councils charged with promoting public understanding of longterm challenges. The practice of holding annual FMCs should also be revived, with some adjustments. The emphasis should be shifted from deal-making to agenda-setting. Meetings should be preceded by the publication of a negotiated agenda and concluded with a negotiated communiqué. A secretariat might produce background reports to support the shared agenda. Indigenous leaders should also be included in these reinvigorated national summits. Regular meetings of this type would help stabilize the national policy agenda and orient it toward long-term challenges. At the same time, federal and provincial governments must develop a more deliberate and energetic approach to repair of the public sphere. This may include measures to improve civic knowledge among Canadians, protect Canadian journalism, discourage further corrosion of civic discourse, and reduce illicit foreign influences. Governments have already taken some measures to achieve these objectives, but overall reform efforts have lacked coherence and intensity. The central problem, the threat to self-determination posed by the decay of the public sphere, is rarely identified explicitly. It is also past time for an independent review of the federal public service and our de facto political service -- that is, the stratum of political staff. Some commentators have questioned the usefulness of an independent review, suggesting that an internal reform effort, perhaps led by the Privy Council Office, would be quicker and equally effective. But an internal review would likely be limited in scope: for example, it would probably avoid potentially controversial questions about legislative reform and the role of political staff. And even if controversial questions were addressed, the credibility of an internally-guided review would be questioned. Readers may question the soundness or adequacy of these reforms. In that case, we should step back and consider the broader question. It is difficult to dispute that conditions of governance will be challenging for the next several decades. Similarly, it seems beyond dispute that the Canadian system is complex, being composed of many loosely joined parts, and consequently vulnerable to problems of shortsightedness, confusion, and mis-coordination. No one thinks we should remedy these problems by re-concentrating political power and restricting rights. But what is the alternative path? How do we encourage far-sightedness and coordination without compromising our commitment to an open society, in which political power is broadly diffused? This is the critical question for Canada… Alasdair Roberts is a professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He writes extensively on problems of governance, law and public policy. His latest book, The Adaptable Country: How Canada Can Survive the Twenty-First Century, was published by McGill-Queen’s University Press in September 2024. His previous book, Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century, was published by Polity in 2023. The adaptability of the Canadian system has declined over the forty years. It does not perform as well as it should in anticipating and managing long-run dangers. In calmer times, a decline of adaptability might not be troubling. But conditions of governance in the coming decades are likely to be turbulent and dangerous.
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