Canadian Government Executive - Volume 22

March 2016 //

Canadian Government Executive /

because he did not want the professionals

driven to distraction or the grand achieve-

ment they had accomplished lost in hair-

splitting.

Barber developed for the cabinet a Map

of Delivery on which departments could

plot their reforms. The vertical axis indi-

cated the boldness of the reform and the

horizontal access the quality of execution.

The result was four quadrants:

•

Status quo

for initiatives with little bold-

ness and poor quality of execution.

•

Controversy without impact

for initiatives

with lots of boldness but feeble execution.

•

Improved outcomes

for initiatives with

little boldness but strong execution.

•

Transformation

for those initiatives that

were bold and well executed.

Obviously the fourth was his favourite. But

either of the final two – in which execution

was strong – would be an improvement.

Cabinet ministers, through strong execu-

tion, needed to shift their portfolio over

time to the more favourable outcomes.

Along with the delivery map, he pro-

moted the delivery chain. When a minis-

ter makes a promise, what is required to

make it reality? “There must be some de-

livery chain if there is to be delivery,” he

said. The chain starts with the consumer,

for example the 11-year-old whose literacy

was supposed to improve, influenced by

the first link of the chain, the teacher, the

second link, the literacy co-ordinator, and

so on until the last link in the chain, the

minister. Delivery chains can be complex.

But the key is to analyze and understand

the delivery chain for your initiative, so

you can figure out how to exert influence

on every link – in particular, strengthening

weak links that emerge.

“Interestingly, as time went by, once of-

ficials had clarified the delivery chain and

started to exert influence on it, they found

their jobs much more worthwhile. Many

civil servants, after all, had embarked on

their careers motivated by the thought of

making a difference, only to be ground

down by the inertia of the machine of

which they had become a part. Often we

found we had reignited their motivation;

they were once again making a differ-

ence,” he noted.

The stocktakes with the prime minister

helped to keep focus on the successes and

lapses in addressing the delivery chain. A

soccer fan, Barber also pressured depart-

ments by comparing their performance

to each other on these priorities in what

he called league tables, similar to league

standings for sports teams. His team would

meet with the department and fill out, with

numerical grades, a report card assessing

the degree of the challenge; the quality

of planning, implementation and perfor-

mance management; the capacity of the

responsible unit to drive progress; and the

state of delivery. There was a final score for

likelihood of delivery, and for each target a

colour coding of whether it was red (highly

problematic), amber red (problematic), am-

ber/green (mixed) or green.

Deliverology has been adopted in other

countries, which have built on Britain’s

success and Barber has written two oth-

er books,

Deliverology 101: A Field Guide

for Educational Leaders

and

How to run

a Government so that Citizens Benefit and

Taxpayers don’t go Crazy.

Barber has also

been working as a principal with the

London office of the well-known McKin-

sey & Company consulting firm and was

the lead author of its eight-page primer,

Deliverology: From Idea to Implementa-

tion. It sets out three critical components:

Formation of the delivery unit, data col-

lection for setting targets and trajecto-

ries, and the establishment of routines to

deliver.

“Through each of these components

runs a critical thread: relationship build-

ing. None of the techniques described

here will work to greatest effect without

senior leaders first thinking through the

way relationships are built – among an

organization’s top leaders and those re-

sponsible for delivery, as well as among

the delivery staff and the line staff respon-

sible for implementation,” he writes, with

colleagues Paul Kihn and Andy Moffit.

The delivery unit should be a small group

of dedicated individuals focused exclu-

sively on achieving impact and improving

outcomes. It challenges performance con-

stantly and asks difficult questions, taking

any excuses off the table. “While a delivery

unit should acknowledge competing pri-

orities and unexpected situations, it should

also consistently push for faster progress,

knowing full well that the tendency of any

system is toward inertia,” they write.

They distinguish between a delivery unit

and a project management office, which

might guide one particular unit. The deliv-

ery unit is longer lasting, an extension of

senior officials. It needs respected leaders,

Deliverology

a limited size, and top talent, chosen for

abilities at problem solving, data analysis,

relationship management, feedback, and

coaching. The delivery unit needs to be

housed outside the line management hi-

erarchy of the bureaucracy. “It should not

be managed by any of the people or organi-

zations it is trying to influence, nor should

it directly manage those people or organi-

zations,” they warn. It must be a “critical

friend,” trusted and credible, but able to

deliver difficult messages.

Deliverology focuses on the most critical

outcomes, trying to discourage firefighting

– getting distracted by the emergencies of

the day. The targets should be both ambi-

tious and realistic – not vague, but specific

and with a time frame for achievement.

The delivery unit can play an important

role in setting targets, perhaps negotiat-

ing between top leaders and the relevant

performance units, but its prime role is to

make sure the targets remain prominent

for the entire public-sector system.

For every target the delivery unit also

should be setting a trajectory, or the various

performance levels that will be achieved

in heading towards the target. “Presented

well, trajectories have a powerful visual

impact that can clearly communicate the

gap between performance and expectation

at any point in time,” they write.

As well, the delivery unit has to set

up routines that bring people together

for evaluating progress. Annual reviews

aren’t sufficient; the government needs

more frequently scheduled, structured

sessions. These create deadlines that pro-

pel action.

There can be monthly “notes,” in which

a succinct summation of progress is given,

along with sharing current and emerg-

ing issues in delivering on the promise.

Stocktakes are quarterly meetings to re-

view and discuss progress in depth on the

priorities. As with Tony Blair, you want

the key player or players there. Delivery

reports are presented every six months to

the senior leaders.

Barber believes in this, an apostle for

getting the big things done in govern-

ment. But more importantly, Prime Minis-

ter Justin Trudeau believes in it and is set-

ting up his own delivery unity. Get ready.

It’s 2016, after all.

Barber says the modern politician’s dilemma

is: You have to have a long-term strategy, but

unless it delivers short terms results nobody

will believe you.