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May 2016 //

Canadian Government Executive /

11

Policy

advisers, and senior officials in Ottawa,

Victoria and Fredericton. In all three cases,

the evidence was clear that advisers often

exercise policy influence but in different

ways. As “buffers”, partisan advisers are di-

rect sources of policy advice. As “bridges,”

they are key mechanisms for the integra-

tion of policy advice from various sources

inside and outside of government. Their

buffering and bridging strengthen politi-

cal control by increasing the contestabil-

ity of policy advice that makes its way to

decision makers. They add value to policy

analysis. “Buffering” and “bridging” are

typical policy advisory functions. In this

sense partisan advisers are among many

participants in the advisory system who

supply and exchange views in relation to

any number of policy issues.

The “moving” and “shaping” functions

are newer, and illustrate the unique access

of partisan advisers in the policy process.

Advisers are often involved in multiple

facets of the development of policy, con-

tributing to: definition of policy problems,

elaboration of policy options, and working

hand in glove with ministers, colleagues,

and public servants to shape and shepherd

policy through the system.

As privileged actors at the apex of power

they “move” and “shape” policy throughout

its formulation. In doing so, advisers sys-

temically engaged in policy work that pro-

vided political perspective and oversight

by way of their involvement in coordina-

tion, process management, content-based

alignment and calibration. This work is a

key vehicle by which partisan advisers can

increase public service “responsiveness”

and ensure the policy agenda of govern-

ment materialized.

Premier’s and Prime Minister’s Office

(PMO) staff were uniquely placed to un-

dertake important horizontal administra-

tive/technical and “front-end” formulation

activities. In all cases this set of actors was

found to benefit public service policy-

making instruments and participate in

formal policy-making processes. This is

unsurprising as PMO and premier’s office

staffs have long been noted as influential

policy actors. However what was surpris-

ing were differences in how they under-

took that work, who they interacted with

in doing it, and differences in what they

emphasized as important in their policy

functions.

Comparatively, ministers’ offices were

however not all created the same. Ot-

tawa’s ministerial offices were larger,

more sophisticated, and were clearly ac-

tive policy workers who served important

functions vis-à-vis their departments, and

also as sources of policy capacity for the

PMO to draw upon. Victoria advisers too

were quite clearly engaging in moving

and shaping in policy development but

did not benefit from the capacity or in-

struments available to their Ottawa coun-

terparts. In Fredericton ministers’ offices

were more active on the advisory front

and far less engaged in formal policy de-

velopment.

In all three jurisdictions ministerial ad-

visers often serve as important bridges to

officials and facilitate important resource

exchanges. They are often at the table,

for example, when the initial appraisal

of what is politically feasible is debated.

They are also present when formal and

informal stakeholder consultations on

specific pieces of legislation are undertak-

en. Most characterized them as conduits

for the transmission of pertinent policy or

political information and pointed to their

usefulness in lubricating the circulation

of policy advice in and around the core

executive of government.

On content or substantive grounds,

“shaping” has clear and direct linkages

with attempts to “align” governmental

policy formulation with the substantive

policy direction or preferences of minis-

ters/government. For example, it may in-

volve administrative-technical calibration

or refinement of options being developed

by officials based on evidentiary or consis-

tency preferences. Alternatively, partisan-

political shaping served to increase politi-

cal control through improved alignment of

government’s policy objectives with stated

partisan-political preferences communicat-

ed during elections, in platforms, or with

key political “stakeholders.”

Partisan advisers are engaged in the

integration of external advisory policy

feedback and input. They attend meet-

ings, witness parliamentary committee

hearings, conduct formal and informal

consultations and interact with the policy

environment. In all three capitals a broad

spectrum of respondents to my interviews

were clear that their roles extended far be-

yond their minister’s office.

It is clear that while the public service

remains the primary source of much of

the advice that goes to ministers, partisan

advisers were at times considered sub-

ject matter experts, and always engaged

in advisory activity that served to contest

or supplement policy advice coming from

elsewhere. The priority for partisan advis-

ers is to ensure that a political lens had

been applied to any advice, and that suf-

ficient options and sources of advice were

made available to decision-makers.

These findings help us gain a better un-

derstanding of the politics of policy work.

They suggest a contemporary political-ad-

ministrative relationship where partisan

advisers and public servants work sepa-

rate spheres but also engage regularly in

overlapping activities. The collective aim

being to help the ministers get to the op-

timal decision. Likewise, how partisan ad-

visers go about giving or brokering advice,

how they engage in the substance and pro-

cesses of formal policy development, and

with whom they interact along the way

can differ in important ways. This helps

gain an improved and more accurate pic-

ture of if and how they exercise influence

in policymaking.

J

onathan

C

raft

is Assistant Professor

of Political Science at the University

of Toronto. This article is based on

findings published in

Backrooms and

Beyond Partisan Advisers and the

Politics of Policy Work

published by the

University of Toronto Press this month.

The priority for partisan advisers is to

ensure that a political lens had been

applied to any advice, and that sufficient

options and sources of advice were made

available to decision-makers.